The Interpretive Structure of Truth in Heidegger by McGrath, S. J.
 Michael Dummett, The Seas of Language (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 235.1
 See Daniel Dahlstrom, “The Scattered Logos,” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to2
Metaphysics, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 83-
102, at 85. For a defense of bi-valence see W.V.O. Quine, Pursuit of Truth, rev. ed. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1992), 90-93.
46
4
The Interpretive Structure of Truth in Heidegger
S. J. McGrath
I.
Let us begin with a ‘minimal correspondence theory of truth’ (CT): x is true if
and only if p. Such a theory requires any usage of the word ‘true’ to imply
possible conditions by which what is said to be true could in fact be false (not-p).
This distinguishes minimal CT from “robust CT.” Robust CT stipulates (a) that
truth is correspondence with fact, and related to this, (b) only language which
corresponds to fact is meaningful.  Minimal CT says only that a legitimate truth1
claim can also be false. Does minimal CT also, at least implicitly, install bi-
valence as the necessary condition of every meaningful proposition?
Before a phenomenological evaluation of minimal CT is possible, the
phenomenological objection to robust CT needs to be clarified. Here the early
Heidegger becomes analytically relevant. Heidegger’s critique of the (robust)
correspondence theory of truth places him in a certain proximity to defenders of
minimal CT.   Heidegger’s primordial truth (aletheia)–not correspondence but2
revelation, is the removal of a veil (lethe)–defers falsifiability to a penultimate
level of discourse. Aletheia does not have falsehood as its opposite. The
unrevealed is not false, but hidden. It does not show itself as what it isn’t–the
unrevealed is not necessarily a dissimulation (although a dissimulation is a non-
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revelation); rather, it does not show itself at all. The primordial sense of truth as
revelation does not have an equiprimordial sense of falsehood corresponding to
it. Hence the break with robust CT’s identification of falsifiability and
meaningfulness. Robust CT achieves univocity at the expense of adequacy. It
reduces truth to propositional truth. Like every reductionism, it elevates a partial
sense to a normative definition. Truth becomes a univocal term at the expense of
the varied senses of the word ‘true.’
To demonstrate the diversity of meanings of ‘truth,’ we need not dig into
ancient Greek. In fact, it is plain in the English usage of the word ‘true’ that truth
as ‘the property of a proposition corresponding to a state of affairs’ is only one
of a multiplicity of meanings of the term.
Consider the following usages of ‘true.’
(1) “She always comes through in the end. She is a true friend.” Here true
means steadfast and loyal. The aletheic usage of ‘true’ here is more original than
falsifiability, more original than ‘true’ in the sense of “It is true that she is a true
friend.” There are two meanings of ‘true’ operative in this last sentence. Only the
first has as its opposite falsehood. 
(2) “Moving to the big house in the country was a dream come true for
the newlyweds.” This is truth as fulfilment of an intention. When a dream comes
‘true’ does it correspond with anything? A CT theorist might want to say that the
fact corresponds to my dream. But it would be more accurate to say that my
dream comes into actuality in fact. 
(3) “The carpenter trued up the doorframe.” This is a verbal sense which
means to position something so as to make it balanced, level, or square. No
correspondence is possible here, but rather the securing and stabilizing of a
structure.
The notion of truth as correspondence to fact (minimal or robust) fails to
account for any of these three senses of ‘true.’ An etymological analysis of the
English word ‘true’ deepens the ambiguity. ‘True’ comes from the Old English
triewe, which means “faithful, trustworthy.” The root tru seems to be related to
the Indo-European root dru which means “tree.” This would explain why triewe
also means “tree” in Old English. The equivocation here evokes the notion of
strength, reliability, “steadfast as an oak.” Thus we get the derivations, Lithuanian
drutas or “firm”;  Old Irish dron or “strong.” The sense of truth as “consistent
with fact” is first recorded in English in 1205–late in the history of the word.  We3
are left with the implication that the oldest meaning of ‘true’ is not
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correspondence with fact but faithful, reliable, trustworthy. But in what sense is
the ‘true’ trustworthy or reliable? Is it trustworthy or reliable because it
corresponds to the facts? Or is a correspondence to fact true because it is
trustworthy and reliable? What could trustworthy mean in a philosophical
context? Trustworthy for what? I can rely on the trustworthy; it supports me in my
projects, my living. Truth as trustworthy has a concrete reference to living.
Aristotle tells us that when dealing with an analogous term–one admitting
of multiple and related senses that cannot be reduced to a univocal definition–we
cannot speak of a single meaning. We deal, rather, with a series of participations
in a preeminent meaning (what the Scholastic Cajetan will call the analogy of
attribution). The many meanings of the common term form an ordered set, with
one meaning primary and the others secondary. The primary meaning, the primum
analogatum is presupposed by the others while presupposing none of them. If
truth is an analogous term, what is the primary analogate, the preeminent sense
(modi significandi) of the word, which is presupposed by all others? The primary
analogate will be implicit in the other senses, but they will not be implicit in it.
To take a recurring example, ‘health’ in a meal, or ‘health’ in a complexion,
presupposes ‘health’ in a body–the meal is ‘healthy’ or the complexion is
‘healthy’ because it contributes to or is indicative of ‘health’ in a body. But
‘health’ in the sense of ‘a healthy meal’ or ‘a healthy complexion’ is not
presupposed by ‘health’ in the sense of ‘a healthy body.’
It seems plain from the above examples that “correspondence with fact”
could not be the primum analogatum of the analogous senses of ‘true’ outlined
above. ‘True’ in the sense of “true friend,” or even stronger, in the verbal sense
of ‘trueing’ does not presuppose ‘true’ in the sense of correspondence to fact. But
does ‘true’ in the sense of correspondence to fact presuppose ‘true’ in the sense
of trustworthy or reliable?  
The problem of the diversification of analogous meanings was the
beginning of Heidegger’s philosophical career. He often reminded us that he was
first awakened to philosophy by reading Franz Brentano’s dissertation, Von der
mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (On the Several Senses
of Being in Aristotle), the book that drew Heidegger’s attention to the problem of
the ambiguity inherent in the notion of being.  Aristotle notes that ‘being’ means4
a variety of different things in different contexts. The ‘is’ in the sentence
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“Socrates is a man” is doing different work than the ‘is’ in the sentence “Socrates
is older than Plato.” The many meanings of being according to Aristotle are
analogously related. Heidegger’s youthful interest in analogy remained with him
his whole life, and in some ways, shows itself in all of his work. The exposure of
shades of meaning in terms, for example, Heidegger’s tedious etymologies, is
motivated by a commitment to expose the variations in meaning in the history of
a word, what Derrida calls “dissemination.” The danger for us, in the age of
calculation, is to mitigate the ambiguity by an imposed univocity. We nail down
a single meaning and foreclose dissemination. A further question for a minimal
CT theorist: does the substitution of an empty symbol (technically, a sign) for the
polysemous word also foreclose dissemination? ‘P’ cannot diversify itself into
analogous meanings because ‘P’ does not mean anything at all. But are the
multiple meanings of whatever ‘P’ might stand for left intact by the
symbolization? 
II.
The early Freiburg lectures have changed the way we read Heidegger by giving
us a different Heidegger to read. In his courses, lectures, and writings leading up
to the 1927 publication of Being and Time, we meet a young Heidegger who has
not yet divorced himself from the philosophical community, a philosopher
intensely committed to phenomenology as a collaborative enterprise, indeed a
scientific enterprise, where science is understood as the search for a primordial
understanding of life (Urwissenschaft). His highly innovative lectures quickly
departed from the technical terminology of his teachers, Heinrich Rickert and
Edmund Husserl, on the grounds of an early insight (perhaps his “single” thought
before it incarnated itself in the language of ontology): the grasp of the limitations
of the theoretical attitude, which contaminated the philosophical tradition. The
theoretical attitude imports an unexamined assumption into phenomenology: the
assumption that the human being is primarily a knower, that is, a subject who
relates to objects through a cognitive faculty. If phenomenology is to give an
account of life as it is lived, it must first dislodge this assumption. The human
being is primarily one who lives, that is, projects herself upon existential
possibilities for being-in-the-world. The young Heidegger explores alternatives
to theoretical paradigms, what he calls “hermeneutical concepts,” which, pace
Husserl, are not grasped in an objective intuition of essence; they are rather
always already understood in living, if never adequately known, the domains of
meaning within which we pursue our projects of living. Heidegger calls the grasp
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of these basic concepts “hermeneutical intuition.” Because hermeneutical
concepts are multiply variegated by the different situations in which they operate,
the intuition can only be accomplished through an immersion into that which is
to be described. Hence the vital language of Heidegger’s phenomenology, the talk
of “enactment,” “being gripped,” “taking action within metaphysics,” and later
“decision.” Description must immerse itself in the fore-structure of what is to be
described. It must be transparent to its own Vorhabe, Vorsicht and Vorgriff,  the5
levels of anticipatory prejudgment that make the domain of meaning of the
interpretation possible. Hermeneutical concepts are not added onto a theoretically
neutral state of affairs; rather, they constitute the state of affairs. Interpretedness
is inherent in every description, because it is inherent in experience. Pure
description in the sense of an account of facts which is free of interpretive fore-
structure is an illusion. The ideal of objectivity is itself an interpretive fore-
structure, a determination of what can and cannot show itself in a certain
situation, namely the situation of theoretical science. Phenomenology cannot
allow itself to be confined a priori to a limited domain of meaning by the
theoretical attitude, which rules the sciences; its adequacy to its subject matter
will be determined by the degree to which it allows its language to grow out of
life and its meanings to be refracted and adumbrated by it.
The young Heidegger’s “hermeneutics of facticity” is all the more
relevant today, when the analysts are discovering Being and Time, and earnestly
trying to situate it in the context of historical positions. Is Heidegger a realist or
an anti-realist? Is he a pragmatist of some kind? To what “ism” does this most
elusive of philosophical giants belong? “Like any philosophical view,” Taylor
Carmen writes, “Heidegger makes sense only in relation to the competing
alternatives.”  Carmen describes Heidegger’s position as “social externalism,” by6
contrast with the externalism advocated by Putnam and Kripke. “The world that
has authority over the contents of our intentional attitudes is not the physical
world itself, but the social world, that is, the world of human customs and
institutions made accessible to us by our ordinary shared normative standards of
intelligibility.”  This translation of Heidegger into the language of analytical7
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philosophy is not necessarily wrong. But something is lost in the translation,
perhaps the central point of Being and Time. Heidegger’s text is not intended to
add arguments to existing debates, or to decide metaphysical issues; it is meant
to destroy the ways of speaking enshrined by these debates.
III.
In Being and Time Heidegger argues that the truth of the proposition–in Aristotle
the logos apophansis–is not originally a function of judgment but rather a “letting
something be seen.”  Apophainô means “to show.” Drawing on Aristotle’s8
Metaphysics, Heidegger formulates a notion of truth whose opposite is not
falsehood but non-apprehension, agnoein, or as one translator of Aristotle puts it
“non-contact.”  This means that the falsifiable truth claim is derivative; it9
presupposes a deeper sense of truth as disclosure, primordial truth, revelation.
With the distinction between propositional truth and primordial truth,
Heidegger breaks the bond between truth and knowledge. Aletheia is prior to
knowledge, which means it is not knowledge.  In the view of some10
commentators, Heidegger hereby becomes vulnerable to the charge of relativism.
Ernst Tugendhat, for example, argued in 1967 that Heideggers notion of
“disclosure” annuls the possibility of verifiable philosophical knowledge. That
which cannot be false cannot be verifiably true either.
If truth means un-concealment, in the Heideggerian sense, then it follows
that an understanding of world in general is opened up but not that it is
put to the test. What must have seemed so liberating about this
conception is that, without denying the relativity and opaqueness of our
historical world, it made possible an immediate and positive
truth-relation, an explicit truth-relation which no longer made any claim
to certainty and so could not be disturbed by uncertainty either … That
he already calls disclosure in and of itself truth leads to the result that it
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is precisely not related to the truth but is protected from the question of
truth.  11
Disclosure compromises truth by precluding the possibility of testing. Primordial
truth becomes totalitarian. The skepticism, ostensibly essential to philosophy, is
threatened and the possibility emerges of a privileged revelation, which cannot
be shared but only declared to others. These are disturbing consequences of
Heidegger’s retrieval of aletheia. But they do not stand as grounds for rejecting
the interpretation. A phenomenological discovery cannot be ruled out because we
do not like what it implies. If what is at issue here is a phenomenology of truth,
then the matter itself alone can decide the issue.
The medieval formula for the correspondence theory of truth, adaequatio
intellectus et rei (truth is an agreement between thought and the thing), assumes,
Heidegger says, that truth is a relation. The relation need not be taken as an
identification. Signs, which have a relation to the signified, point without
identification. Six corresponds to (agrees with) 16-10 without being identical to
it. “With regard to what do intellectus and res agree?” Heidegger asks.  The12
Cartesian straw man is summoned and dutiful responds: the agreement is between
a mental representation and an extra-mental thing. This of course leads to the
critical problem, by what criterion can I guarantee that my mental representation
corresponds with an extra-mental thing? If my knowledge of things is always
mediated by mental representations, the criterion will itself be another mental
representation. But how am I to know that my second mental representation
agrees with the thing? Heidegger’s phenomenological investigation of the
problem distinguishes between the act of judgment and its content. A judgment
is an intentional act, it has an “about which,” or directedness. Heidegger shows
that in a judgment I intend the thing itself, not my representation of it. I judge that
the temperature outside has dropped because I see the snow melting off the roof
through the window. My judgment does not intend a mental representation but the
thing. It is directed to the state of affairs outside my window. “Asserting is a way
of being towards the thing itself.”13
When the mediation via representation drops out of the analysis, the
proposition is revealed to be more of a sign than a picture; it does not re-present
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but points out. It is not a substitute but an indication of a thing. As such the
proposition does not call for comparison but confirmation (Ausweis). The
proposition is confirmed (ausgewiesen) in the thing or not. The confirmation
consists in a re-showing of the thing. The unconfirmed proposition is falsified by
being resisted as a possible interpretation by the thing itself. The assertion reveals
or fails to reveal the thing anew.  The confirmed proposition, however, remains14
hermeneutically situated, that is, determined by time and presupposition. The
showing which the proposition makes possible is historical. Not only is it unique
and unprecedented, but it emerges out of a field of possible showings. The
proposition, by virtue of its implicit fore-structure, its foundations in Dasein’s
projective understanding, opens up these possibilities for interpretation (and
necessarily forecloses others), ultimately lighting the thing up in a singular
fashion. “Assertion and its structure (namely, the apophantical ‘as’) are founded
upon interpretation and its structure (viz, the hermeneutical ‘as’) and also upon
understanding–upon Dasein’s disclosedness.”  The proposition, then, emerges15
out of an existential situation, within which the possibilities for a showing of
beings have already been decided. “Assertion communicates entities in the ‘how’
of their uncoveredness.”  But assertion can just as easily fail to communicate the16
uncoveredness of beings, assertion can cover over what has been uncovered.
Hence truth must be “wrested” from beings; beings must be snatched out of
hiddenness.17
In his discussion of truth in Being and Time Heidegger references
Aristotle Metaphysics È 10. Here Aristotle says that the being of truth is twofold,
“contact” and “assertion.” The truth of contact is the more primordial truth, for
the truth of assertion presupposes it. It has as its opposite, not falsehood, but
“ignorance,” or “non-contact.” “For it is not possible to be in error regarding the
question what a thing is, save in an accidental sense; and the same holds good
regarding non-composite substances (for it is not possible to be in error about
them).”  It is not possible to be in error about the what; the apprehension of18
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whatness, like the sense impression, is unfalsifiable. The judgment about the what
is falsifiable, but it presupposes apprehension. Before assertions, there must be
contact, and in the contact, the primordial truth of the thing first shows itself.  The
non-showing of the thing is not an experience of falsehood, but of oblivion. The
truth of the thing is not there. “And truth means knowing these objects, and falsity
does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance–and not an ignorance which is like
blindness; for blindness is akin to a total absence of the faculty of thinking.”19
What is this ignorance that is not blindness? It is not the absence of the capacity
to know the truth, but the absence of the truth. The thing, which could show itself,
and could become the subject matter of an assertion, does not show itself. But let
us allow Heidegger to provide the gloss. “To be closed off and covered up
belongs to Dasein’s facticity. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the
proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in
untruth.’”20
IV.
Heidegger’s neo-Aristotelian account of the two-tiers of truth, primordial truth or
situated disclosure, and propositional truth, language that points out–which can
be confirmed or not–leaves the multiple meanings of truth intact. We have not
lost the bivalent judgment, the falsifiable claim, defended by minimal CT. Rather,
we have localized it in a special kind of discourse, the pointing out of what has
been revealed. Now the problem with robust CT comes to the fore. The robust CT
theorist does not merely stipulate that every truth claim can be falsified; he goes
further and stipulates the kinds of disclosures that can be the subject of a truth
claim, i.e., the disclosure of an objective publically verifiable fact. But among the
kinds of things that might be pointed out, things that show themselves, the
publicly accessible fact is only one. Return, for a moment, to the showing of
friendship, which is pointed out in the statement, “Peter is a true friend.” How
does friendship show itself? Does the acknowledgment of friendship admit of the
same kind of public verifiability, as say, measuring someone’s height? We can
say of course, the proposition, “Peter is a true friend” either does or does not
correspond to a fact. The proposition “Peter is my friend” is true if and only if
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Peter is my friend. But that is to talk around the problem. What do I recognize
when I recognize friendship? Friendship does not show itself directly, nor is it
objectively available when it does. It is a showing that is not accessible to the
theoretical attitude. It is not a present-at-hand thing. Friendship shows itself
through action in an inter-subjective situation. Friendship only shows itself to
friendship; that is, I must be disposed in friendship to see friendship. To
acknowledge Peter as my friend, as a true friend, is to commit to a certain
interpretation of Peter’s actions. The acknowledgment is hermeneutical, i.e., a
self-involving act, not a theoretical observation. 
To return to the etymology of the English word ‘truth,’ it may be that
“trustworthiness” is the deepest sense of the word. The true is the trustworthiness
of the original showing. Without the showing that we can commit to as true, there
could be no proposition, and no CT, minimal or robust. Without an original
showing, which commissions us to speak–or to remain silent–there is neither the
possibility of deception nor of fidelity. The abyss of uncertainty which the two-
tier theory of truth opens up in our philosophical discourse does not necessarily
catapult philosophy into relativism. But it does indicate the finitude of
understanding. 
